a/work· 31 October 2026 · 6 min read

For 125 years a house cost what wages said it should. What happened in 1984?

Cover of Economic Servitude (Omxus Press)

In May 2017 a young Australian property developer went on national television and told young people why they couldn't afford a house: "When I was trying to buy my first home, I wasn't buying smashed avocado for $19" (60 Minutes, 2017). A house now costs about 14 years of a typical worker's earnings. That's about 47,000 avocados on toast, before interest.

Most of us have absorbed some version of that. If you can't get ahead, you must have done something wrong. The old records say otherwise, and they have a date on them.

A quiet rule that held for 125 years

Economists rebuilt house prices and wages for rich countries back to 1870 from old records, and the data are free to download (Knoll et al., 2017; Jordà et al., 2017). Divide Australia's house price index by its wage index and, from 1870 to 1995, the answer averages 0.91 on a scale where 1990 is 1.00. It ranges from 0.50 in 1949 to 1.56 in the land boom of 1889. If anything it drifts down, because wages grew a little faster than houses.

Then it stops. Since 1996 the ratio has risen 2.89% a year, and in 2020 it stood at 1.84, which is 2.27 times its 1980 level. A statistical search for the year the pattern changed lands on 1984. Nobody voted for that year. Between 1980 and 1986 Australia removed deposit rate controls, floated its dollar, let foreign banks in and lifted the ceiling on home-loan rates (Battellino, 2007). Banks could lend far more against houses. Mortgage debt went from 8.7% of GDP in 1980 to 90.7% in 2020 (Jordà et al., 2017).

In dollars: the mean price of an Australian dwelling over the median annual earnings of an employee was 10.5 in 2011, 13.7 in 2022 and 14.2 in 2025. Nothing about the houses got that much better. The same hours of nursing, teaching or truck driving simply buy far less roof.

Where the rest of the money went

The national accounts show the same story. Workers' share of the income the country produces peaked at 62.0% in 1974-75 and fell to 50.3% in 2021-22. It was 54.1% in 2025-26 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2026). The trend since 1975 is a fall of 8.1 percentage points, which at today's income is about $214 billion a year going to owning instead of working.

And owning pays better than the economy grows. Across 1901 to 2020 the real return on wealth in Australia beat real growth by 2.44 points a year, and by 4.18 points since 1980 (Jordà et al., 2019). Thomas Piketty called this r > g: when it holds, those who own pull ahead of those who work (Piketty, 2014). It held on average in all 16 economies with data.

An old pattern in new clothes

In 1964 Donald Horne wrote that "Australia is a lucky country run mainly by second-rate people who share its luck" (Horne, 1964). Rome owned the person. The medieval manor owned the land the person was tied to. English enclosure fenced off the common fields, so a family that once grew its own food had to sell its labour to eat (Federici, 2004). Each age had its reason: the natural order, the will of God, the free market. Ours is "there is no alternative", with a side of avocado.

The useful question isn't who to blame. People inside each system mostly thought they were doing right, and that developer probably did too. The useful question is what changes the flow.

What happens when people get a floor

Michael Tubbs grew up in Stockton, California, raised by a teenage mother, with a father in prison. He became its mayor at 26. From February 2019 his city gave 125 randomly chosen residents $500 a month for two years, no conditions. In the first year full-time employment among recipients rose from 28% to 40%, against 32% to 37% in the comparison group. They were less anxious and less depressed, and under 1% of tracked spending went on alcohol or tobacco (West et al., 2021). It's one small trial, in one city, with results from before the pandemic.

Alaska has paid every resident an annual dividend since 1982. It didn't reduce overall employment, and part-time work rose (Jones & Marinescu, 2022). Among the Eastern Band of Cherokee, an extra $4,000 a year for the poorest families added a year of schooling by 21 and cut minor crime at ages 16 and 17 by 22% (Akee et al., 2010). A floor doesn't stop people working. It lets them refuse the worst deals, and when people can refuse, the deals get better.

Australia came close once. In April 2020 the government added $550 a fortnight to JobSeeker, almost doubling it, within weeks. It wasn't a basic income and it ran in a pandemic, but it showed the system can move fast when it wants to. It ended in March 2021. An $800-a-week dividend for all 21.79 million adults would cost $907 billion a year gross, 31.0% of GDP. The net cost after higher earners repay through tax is a fraction of that, and nobody has yet worked out how large. That sum needs doing.

No villain, a design

Three things follow. It isn't natural: houses cost about what wages said for 125 years, and the break has a date. It isn't earned: the share paid to the people who build, grow, teach, nurse, clean, drive, cook and care has fallen for fifty years. It isn't your fault: nobody chose a financial system that lends new money against land, and you certainly didn't, over brunch.

These things were built, step by step. So they can be changed, step by step.

What you can do

Eat the avocado. Then divide your state's median house price by your own annual pay, and send the answer to your federal MP with one question: "What ratio are you aiming for?" Almost no politician has an answer, and it's the only number that would tell you whether housing policy is working. While you're at it, ask what they'd say to a floor under every adult, and what the sum looks like. It's a fair question for a lucky country.

Sources

  1. 60 Minutes. (2017, May 14). Interview with a property developer [Television broadcast]. Nine Network.
  2. Akee, R., Copeland, W. E., Keeler, G., Angold, A., & Costello, E. J. (2010). Parents' incomes and children's outcomes: A quasi-experiment using transfer payments from casino profits. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 86–115. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.1.86
  3. Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2026). Australian national accounts: National income, expenditure and product, June 2026.
  4. Battellino, R. (2007, July 16). Australia's experience with financial deregulation [Address]. Reserve Bank of Australia.
  5. Federici, S. (2004). Caliban and the witch. Autonomedia.
  6. Horne, D. (1964). The lucky country. Penguin.
  7. Jones, D., & Marinescu, I. (2022). The labor market impacts of universal and permanent cash transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 14(2), 315–340.
  8. Jordà, Ò., Knoll, K., Kuvshinov, D., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2019). The rate of return on everything, 1870–2015. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(3), 1225–1298.
  9. Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2017). Macrofinancial history and the new business cycle facts. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 31, 213–263.
  10. Knoll, K., Schularick, M., & Steger, T. (2017). No price like home: Global house prices, 1870–2012. American Economic Review, 107(2), 331–353.
  11. Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press.
  12. West, S., Castro Baker, A., Samra, S., & Coltrera, E. (2021). Preliminary analysis: SEED's first year. Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration.

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