Would a zookeeper pass the way we live?
When a polar bear swam in figure eights, the zoo inspected his life. Scored the same way, the places people live and work fail on 17 of 18 measures.

Cover of The Human Enclosure (Omxus Press)

Cover of Reversing the Burden of Proof in Food Safety (Omxus Press)
On a small island in Papua New Guinea, doctors looked at the faces of 300 young adults and couldn't find a single pimple. If you've ever been fifteen, you'll know how strange that is. What else was missing from that island, and what was missing from their plates?
Kitava is one of the Trobriand Islands. In the early 1990s a Swedish doctor, Staffan Lindeberg, studied the people there. They lived on yams, sweet potato, taro, fruit, fish and coconut. He found stroke and heart disease apparently absent (Lindeberg & Lundh, 1993). Blood pressure was low, people stayed lean as they aged, and their insulin stayed low into old age, on a diet that got about seventy per cent of its energy from carbohydrate.
Then the skin. Among roughly 1,200 people examined, including 300 aged 15 to 25, nobody had acne. Not one case. In Western countries acne affects between 79 and 95 per cent of teenagers (Cordain et al., 2002).
It would be easy to read Kitava as an argument for one diet. The Inuit spoil that. Their traditional food was seal, whale, fish and caribou: almost all fat and protein, the opposite of Kitava. They too were largely free of the diseases that came later, when store-bought food replaced country food (Bjerregaard et al., 2004). In the Bolivian Amazon, 85 per cent of 705 Tsimane adults had no calcium in their coronary arteries at all, the lowest level of coronary atherosclerosis reported for any population (Kaplan et al., 2017).
High carbohydrate, high fat, different continents. What these people share is what they did not eat: processed food, refined sugar and oil, and the thousands of chemicals that came with them. And when they start eating it, the protection goes, within one or two generations. Genes do not change that fast. Food does.
Industrial food at scale is about seventy years old. You can see the experiment in the numbers: take the United Nations' food supply records for 142 countries and set them beside estimates of adult obesity. Where the industrial supply arrived first, obesity is highest a generation later. The 1980 share of food energy from refined sugar and vegetable oil predicted adult obesity in 2013 (Spearman ρ = .61, p < .001) and how far it rose (ρ = .56, p < .001). Each percentage point of refined share in 1980 added 0.30 points to the rise in obesity (95% CI 0.17–0.43), and it held with 1980 national income set aside (0.35 points per point, 95% CI 0.20–0.51; income itself, p = .62).
Recent changes in sugar and oil supply do not track obesity. Obesity rose by more than eleven points on average in every quartile of change, whatever happened to the supply. What predicts the burden is how early a country entered the industrial food system, which is what a long-latency exposure predicts. And sugar and oil are only what the United Nations can count: they do not capture the thing the traditional populations point to, which is processing itself. No international series measures processing: nobody is required to count what nobody is required to prove safe. The evidence is ecological: it measures food available, not food eaten, and it cannot be read as an effect on any one person.
This fight is old. In 1902 Harvey Wiley, chief chemist at the US Department of Agriculture, was sick of watching manufacturers put borax and formaldehyde in food with no evidence it was safe. So he set up a dining room in his building's basement and recruited twelve young men, mostly Bureau staff and medical students, who ate good meals laced with the preservatives of the day, and were weighed and tested. Newspapers called them the Poison Squad. Wiley's experiments helped carry the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (Blum, 2018).
Think about what that means. To protect everyone, a government scientist had to feed poison to volunteers, because nobody selling the stuff had to show a thing. Now look at where we've got to.
Here's the part most people don't know. In the United States, a company can declare its own new ingredient "generally recognised as safe" and sell it without telling the regulator. And for most of what is added to food, nobody has worked out a safe dose. When researchers checked, only 21.6 per cent of chemicals added directly to American food had the feeding studies needed to estimate one (Neltner et al., 2013).
A medicine has to pass years of trials before you take it, under a doctor's eye, at a set dose. A food additive goes to everyone, at any dose, for life, and has to wait until somebody proves it harmful. The thing you swallow once has to prove itself. The thing you swallow three times a day does not.
New Zealand did it in 2013 for "legal highs". Instead of banning each new chemical after it hurt people, the Psychoactive Substances Act made every new product illegal until its maker proved it was low risk, with evidence the maker paid for (New Zealand Parliament, 2013; Rychert & Wilkins, 2018). The lesson cuts both ways: a later amendment barred animal-test evidence, and a review found that no product had been approved (New Zealand Law Society, 2019). A reversed burden that no applicant can meet works as a ban. For food, the route to proof must be one an applicant can complete: independent testing first, paid for by a levy on the company that profits, and a deadline for every self-certified ingredient already on the shelf. Start with the ones that give the eater nothing, like the colours that a British trial linked to hyperactivity in children (McCann et al., 2007).
An island of about a thousand people can't stand in for the world, and there may be something in the genes and the lives of the people on Kitava that we can't see. Survey records measure food available, not food eaten. Nobody can pin a disease in one person on one ingredient from this. But that's the argument. If we can't tell, then the question is who should have to find out.
Three steps would do it: independent review of every substance on self-certification, within a fixed period, paid for by manufacturers; removal of additives that give the eater nothing, starting with artificial colours; and plain-language disclosure of every additive and its purpose.
You can start with the colours. Since 2010 the European Union has made six of them, including 102, 110 and 129, carry a warning that they may affect children's activity and attention. Check the numbers on the packet next time you're at the shop. Then ask your supermarket why the warning isn't here, and write to Food Standards Australia New Zealand and your health minister asking the same thing.
None of this is about shaming anyone's lunch. Plenty of us buy what's cheap and quick because that's what the week allows, and nobody should need a chemistry degree to feed a kid. The people who should be doing the checking are the people selling it. Twelve young men in a basement took that on in 1902. We shouldn't still be asking for volunteers.
When a polar bear swam in figure eights, the zoo inspected his life. Scored the same way, the places people live and work fail on 17 of 18 measures.

Cover of The Human Enclosure (Omxus Press)
In 2008 Denmark began paying night workers with breast cancer. Sleep advice still blames your habits. In a US sample, the job predicts who sleeps too little.

Cover of The Stolen Night (Omxus Press)
Twenty years of American time diaries show young people's time with friends fell from 137 minutes a day to 51, and the hours went to being alone.

Art: Omxus Press