Why an honest account of an accident can sound like an excuse
Listing the causes of an accident is how safety experts find the truth. To an untrained listener it can sound like dodging blame. Four biases explain why.
Rewards work more often than people admit, even small or purely symbolic ones. They backfire when they turn a good deed or a duty into a transaction. The difference lies in what the reward tells people the act means.
Three field studies, each with thousands of people, show rewards changing real behaviour outside a lab.
| Setting | Reward | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| American Red Cross blood drives (Lacetera, Macis & Slonim, 2012) | Small economic rewards | Across nearly 14,000 drives, rewards raised donations, and bigger rewards raised them more. Donors were no more likely to be ineligible. |
| 40 US primary schools, 8,000 children (Loewenstein, Price & Volpp, 2016) | A small prize for eating fruit or vegetables at lunch, for three or five weeks | From a baseline of 39%, the share of children eating a serving doubled. Two months after the prizes stopped, it was still 21% above baseline after three weeks, and 44% above after five. |
| German Wikipedia (Gallus, 2017) | A purely symbolic award to new editors, chosen at random | Award winners kept editing more than others for the whole following year. The award had no cash value and no career benefit. |
The Wikipedia result matters most. A badge on a pseudonymous profile carried no money at all. It worked because it told newcomers they belonged and their work was noticed.
Two famous studies show the opposite.
Economists Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini studied day-care centres in Israel, where some parents arrived late to collect their children. The centres introduced a fine for lateness. Late pickups went up, not down.
Their explanation, in the title of their paper: "A fine is a price." Before the fine, parents felt they were imposing on the teachers. The fine turned lateness into a service they could buy, with a known and modest cost.
In 1970 the British social researcher Richard Titmuss argued that paying for blood would drive away donors who gave out of goodwill. In 2008 two Swedish economists tested it. People could sign up as blood donors for nothing, for a payment of about $7, or for $7 they could give to charity.
The money did not make blood less needed. It changed what donating said about the donor.
A 1999 review of 128 experiments by Edward Deci, Richard Koestner and Richard Ryan found that tangible rewards, given for doing or finishing a task people already found interesting, lowered how much they chose to do it afterwards, on their own time. Children were more affected than university students. Positive feedback, by contrast, raised interest.
This finding is contested. A comment published alongside it questioned how far its conclusions reach. But the field studies above fit its broad shape:
The Red Cross study also found that many extra donors at rewarded drives had simply left nearby drives with no reward. The more valuable the reward, the more donors moved. Count only the rewarded drives and you overstate what the reward achieved. Any scheme needs to measure the whole system, not just the place where the reward sits.
Listing the causes of an accident is how safety experts find the truth. To an untrained listener it can sound like dodging blame. Four biases explain why.
A famous 1989 study had judges set bond nine times higher after thinking about death. Big replications since then paint a weaker picture.
Decades of classroom research favour working together. A 2024 lab study found both lift performance, but only competition raised stress.